Abstract: Governments are increasingly implementing various forms of community-based governance in natural resource management. A conceptual framework for facilitators of communitybased natural resource management is developed in this paper by integrating the literature on management processes and the multiple perspectives of justice. This framework does not explore the relationship between the state and the community, but starts with the assumption that government is acting as an impartial spectator that wants to achieve fair allocations of natural resources between multiple stakeholders. The framework provides a way to systematically embed justice considerations in community-based natural resource management. Two contrasting case studies involving different stages of the water reform process in Australia are used to illustrate this framework. They demonstrate that justice and injustice processes may cascade or get amplified during a communitybased natural resource management program and that the salience of the issue to different stakeholders can affect program outcomes. Managing for justice in community-based water planning: a conceptual framework SUMMARY Governments are increasingly implementing various forms of community-based governance in natural resource management. A conceptual framework for facilitators of communitybased natural resource management is developed in this paper by integrating the literature on management processes and the multiple perspectives of justice. This framework does not explore the relationship between the state and the community, but starts with the assumption that government is acting as an impartial spectator that wants to achieve fair allocations of natural resources between multiple stakeholders. The framework provides a way to systematically embed justice considerations in community-based natural resource management. Two contrasting case studies involving different stages of the water reform process in Australia are used to illustrate this framework. They demonstrate that justice and injustice processes may cascade or get amplified during a community-based natural resource management program and that the salience of the issue to different stakeholders can affect program outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
The decline in the autonomy of the state, combined with a rise in power of both the market and citizenship, has led to an increasingly participatory philosophy of natural resource management (NRM) that emphasizes empowerment, collaboration and a civil society (Rhodes 1997; Bourgon 2008 ). The many empirical case studies of such community based NRM have led to the formulation of theoretical models such as Ostrom's (1990) Institutional Design and Analysis and Sabatiers' (2005) Advocacy Coalition Framework. Another useful approach has been to create conceptual frameworks based on theory. For example Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, which is centred on theories of empowerment, is widely used by policy makers and facilitators. Gray's (1985) examination of collaboration using organisational theory has also been widely applied. Several other frameworks have been developed such as those for partnerships (Long & Arnold 1995) and access (Ribot 2003) , and collaborative action (Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004) . Such conceptual frameworks help show how key concepts or variables can be organised under major themes and, as such, also help improve our understanding of community based NRM.
Justice arguments are now widely invoked to improve theoretical and empirical analysis of nearly every field of community-based NRM. Incorporated into deliberative processes, fairness can be a key consideration when communities make decisions about resource allocations (Nancarrow & Syme 2001) . The importance of justice has also been cited in many real-world contexts, including conflicts over fisheries, forests, water, pollution and climate change (Kals & Russell 2001; Mutz et al. 2002) . Many studies show that people are prepared to move away from self-interest when allocating environmental benefits and burdens among the community (Kals & Russell 2001; Skitka 2009 ). In other words, there is substantial evidence suggesting that fairness motives are critical considerations in community-based NRM. This contrasts with practice, which shows that many planners and managers find implementing justice to be amorphous and aspirational (LaChapelle et al. 2003) . This is despite a steady trend of increasing interest in, and acceptance of, justice as a key principle when facilitating community-based management (Lawrence et al. 1997; Rawls 1971; Slater & Pedersen 2009 ). However, there exists no framework that might allow a facilitator to systematically embed justice considerations into community-based NRM processes.
In this paper I outline a conceptual framework of justice that brings together the various theoretical literatures on fairness and the literature on management functions. I use the terms justice and fairness in a way that corresponds to Adam Smith's impartial spectator (or, in this specific case, government facilitating governance) whose judgement is not biased by any personal stake. This is because an increasingly important, role of government is to bring together stakeholders who have contested values and views about the allocation of natural resources (Bourgon 2008) . Justice using such a framework is mostly operationalized here in relation to representative democratic and deliberative processes, rather than other situations such as collaboration and co-management, even though it is clear that justice is a critical component that pervades most forms of community-based NRM. A second, and closely related, goal of this paper is to provide two case studies of community-based water resource management in Australia to illustrate how using framework might assist practitioners identify considerations in facilitating community-based water resource management.
JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Environmental justice promotes the equitable treatment of people of all races, incomes and cultures with respect to environmental policies and decisions. In addition, environmental justice is regarded as a procedural mechanism that aims to make the process of environmental decision-making open and inclusive, and thereby to avoid environmental injustice (Lawrence et al. 1997) . Environmental justice has begun to be institutionalized at an international level (Slater & Pedersen 2009 ). It has tremendous potential as a framework for analysis of community-based NRM because social justice for present and future generations is central to the concept of environmentally-sustainable development. Rawls (1971) developed a theory of justice for the allocation of resources by society that is often cited in the literature on justice. This theory creates principles that free and rational persons concerned with furthering their own interest would accept as being an initial position of equality. Rawls argues that people under such circumstances have a veil of ignorance about their place in society and, as personal differences are unknown and everyone is rational and similarly situated, the theory makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice. Rawl's principles apply to the general structure of society rather than specific contexts or cases, and they are therefore a useful platform for this particular paper. For Rawls, under such situations justice is assumed to be the same as fairness.
People feel that it is unfair when they have to endure such things as polluted water, contaminated air, loss of their forest and productive lands, and reduced amenities. The frequency and vehemence of claims that decisions about natural resources have not been fair to a particular group is testimony to the widespread conviction that the principle of fairness has power (Mutz et al. 2002) . Fairness has persuasiveness and appeal to the wider community's common moral sense.
Two general criteria for evaluations of fairness have been identified. One is based on the outcomes received (distributive justice); the other is based on the social interactions that led to these outcomes (procedural justice). Distributive justice theories generally assume that people achieve fair outcomes when rewards are compatible to a person's inputs (Lind & Tyler 1988) . By contrast, interactive justice theories are based on a large body of research showing that having a voice is as important as the outcomes, and in some situations it is more important than the outcomes (Lind & Tyler 1988) . Indeed, a sense of procedural fairness can help people accept the legitimacy of decision-making processes from which they are likely to emerge as losers (Nancarrow & Syme 2001; Smith & McDonough 2001) .
Increasingly, researchers have concluded that peoples' conceptualization of justice does not yield to the level of abstraction that is associated with one overall theory. They argue that justice varies with local or specific contexts (Skitka 2009 ). Sometimes referred to as a contingent or situational theory of justice, these researchers point to wide variation in results from investigations that focus on the distribution of socially valued goods (Konow 2003; Skitka 2009) . That is, an individual's view of justice varies not only according to the resource, but also as a result of a number of related factors (e.g. greed, efficiency, interactive justice or self-interest, social inclusion and moral rights) that might also pertain to any particular decision about a resource (Wilke 1991) . Therefore, any perspective of justice in community-based NRM needs to take into account the specific nature of the decision being made. Justice in decision-making can be a multi-stage process in which people may answer a question about what is just at a particular stage of an overall decision-making process, rather than there being some universal standard of ''right'' and ''wrong'', or one ''correct'' response to an overall decision.
Community-based NRM is often used interchangeably with other terms such as participatory democracy, deliberative processes, collaborative planning, co-management and integrated NRM. Most authors recognize a difference between grass-roots capacity-building approaches to community-based NRM and approaches that are associated with the deliberation of benefits and burdens in a particular environmental proposal or decision . With the latter, a key issue is the coordination of action in a manner that is based on consensus reached through free and unconstrained debate among participants (Habermas 1981) . Such communicative rationality has become an influential model of urban, regional, social and environmental planning (Lane 2005) . In communicative rationality, decisions and actions are rational if they arise from circumstances in which all actors have been able to express themselves without inhibition or constraint. Unfortunately, empirical research shows that this has been extremely difficult to achieve in practice (Wollendeck & Yaffee 2000) . As a result, despite a strong body of literature that suggests fairness and justice are central considerations in community-based NRM, particularly when making decisions about resource allocations, justice remains a key challenge for many governments to implement.
THE FRAMEWORK
The framework (Fig 1) is a table with the columns divided into the four management functions (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2008) . In this case it specifically draws on literature on community development and program innovation and applies the terms: conceptualization, development, implementation and review to describe these four phases (Trickett 2009 ).
The different rows proposed in this framework have been developed by examining body of theory and research of justice. It is clear from this literature that justice has two distinct dimensions: one dimension focused on the distribution of the resource, and the other focused on the social interaction that occurs between stakeholders (Skitka 2009 ).The resource dimension concerns itself with the literature on distributive justice, and emphasizes that what a person ends up possessing is important (Lind & Tyler 1988) . The interaction dimension concerns itself largely with the literature on procedural justice, and demonstrates that people can be satisfied with decisions when they feel they have been treated fairly (Lind & Tyler, 1988) . The literature within each of these two dimensions can be further sub-divided into four different clusters related to directly to each of the management phases ( Fig. 1 ).
The components of distributive justice that correspond to the management functions
Theories and research on distributive justice can be grouped into four clusters. The first cluster is largely captured by Young's (2000) theory that society is a place of struggle and that a lack of recognition in the first place inflicts damage not only on different communities but also on the image of these communities to the wider community. That is if you are not recognized you do not exist. In this context, the distribution of acknowledgement is a key element of distributive justice. If the state does not acknowledge a group of people, those people are not only excluded from any distribution but are also regarded as unimportant by others (Schlosberg 2004 ).
The second cluster of literature is associated with voice. Specifically, the second element of distributive justice means that people who have been included are permitted to have an opportunity to speak or be represented. Voice in this context is a two-dimensional phenomenon that includes both influence and opportunity. Influence is a procedural element and widely discussed in the literature, however, simply providing opportunity is a distributive process. It is this element of fairness, opportunity, which is the focus of this cluster. People believe it is important to have a voice even if it results in little influence (Thibaut & Walker 1975) . Authorities' simply canvassing opinions of group members is an important form of fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) . Such provision of voice carries with it more symbolic, non-instrumental consequences (Lind & Tyler 1988) .
The third cluster is the widely researched aspect of distributive justice that focuses on how resources are actually shared. The alternate types of distributive justice are generally agreed to be equity, equality and need (Smith & McDonough, 2001) . Equity suggests that allocations are proportional to deservingness; equality suggests that everyone should get an equal part regardless of cost or effort; and need requires that the benefits are distributed according to peoples' needs.
Finally there is the literature on distributive justice that focuses on controlling behaviour after a decision has been made. In some cases, when people do not get their own way they go forum shopping or end up disregarding the decision-making process (Nancarrow & Syme 2001; Andrew & Edwards 2004) . According to Bentham's theory of justice, a legal framework is therefore important at this stage because without law there is no security and without security there can be no property or ownership (Tisdell, 2003) . Security ensures that owners of property reap the benefits of their labour (Tisdell, 2003) .
The components of procedural justice that correspond to the management functions
Interactive justice theories and research can also be clustered into four different areas. The first area focuses on legitimacy. Rawls (1971) suggests that a condition of participation is that people view one another as free and equal in a system of cooperation. For a process to be fair, participants must think reasonably of the other people with whom they are interacting.
Understanding the needs and expectations of actors, having mutual respect, avoiding stereotyping and building on each participant's strengths are important in this regard (Long & Arnold 1995) . This is no easy task because the notion of a community is complex (Harrington et al. 2008 ) and people may disagree on the principles used by government (the impartial observer) to identify a community. For example, some stakeholders might believe that only those who have tenure rights to a resource should be included in decision-making.
A second cluster of interactive justice theory and research focuses on respectful treatment between people during discussions (Habermas 1981; Lind & Tyler 1988) .
Unfavourable outcomes can be fair as long as the actors are treated with courtesy and respect (Skitka & Crosby 2003) . Indeed, people will remain attached to their group and be satisfied with the authority if a decision affects them negatively when they think the authorities have followed fair procedures (Skitka & Crosby, 2003) . Voice is understood to be procedurally fair because it represents the ability to influence an authority's decisions, potentially allowing group members some instrumental control over decisions that affect them.
A third area of interactive justice focuses on people's tendency to make comparisons when a decision has been made. People engage in mental accounting of their social relationships and also tend to make comparisons in determining justice (Berkowitz & Walster 1976 ). Judgements about fairness are likely to be biased egocentrically: participants tend to justify their assessment of fairness by changing the importance of attributes affecting what is fair in order to see themselves as deserving more (Wade-Benzoni et al. 1996; Konow 2005) .
Such egocentric interpretations of fairness hinder resolution because people are reluctant to accept a settlement if they perceive it to be inequitable (Wade-Benzoni et al. 1996) . This indicates that, while it may not be people's desire to be unfair, they may be unable to interpret information in an unbiased manner. Skitka (2009) suggests that there may be thresholds, when a resource is shared, where this phenomenon starts to become more evident.
Finally there are both theory and research on interactive justice that suggest it is trust rather than the threat of penalty that makes resource-sharing work (Ostrom 1990; Wondelleck & Yaffee 2000) . The literature on trust and justice covers both inter-personal and institutional forms. A large body of theory and research exists demonstrating that trust is critical in the management of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990; Sabatier et al. 2005) . It shows that interpersonal trust tends to be self-enforcing and needs to be learnt (Ostrom 1990) . A related body of research is concerned with institutional trust, or conventions. Conventions are the way things are normally done by a group, and people's moral concern in this regard can play a key role in their behaviour (Kals & Russell 2001) .
CASE STUDIES OF COMMUNITY BASED WATER PLANNING IN

AUSTRALIA
Until the 1990s most water planning in Australia was supply-based. Planning emphasized harvesting and infrastructure development in order to meet the current and projected needs of society (Pigram 2006) . Associated with this approach was a significant decline in critical biophysical and ecological processes and a threat to future resource availability (Kingsford 2000) . Only in the last 20 years has there been a greater emphasis on sustainable water use. This change in emphasis, agreed to by state and federal governments, recognizes the importance of water for environmental purposes, separates land and water rights, vests water rights with individual users and allows markets/trade to resolve water use conflicts in the sector (Pigram 2006) . It is commonly known as the water reform process. As there is a tradeoff between competing outcomes for water systems, it has been mandated that planning and policy must include some form of community participation when implementing any water reforms.
Case Study 1: Murray Land and Water Management Plans
An early part of water reform process occurred in 1994 with the NSW Government's move to privatize government-owned irrigation structures. In the Murray Irrigation Area (Fig. 2) irrigators had also started to band together to address rising water tables and salinity. This meant that the situation in the Murray Irrigation Area was not a simple sell-off of an asset, but a transfer of ownership and responsibilities from government to the irrigators with associated risks and liabilities (McLeod & Warne 2008) . A cooperative approach between landholders, other stakeholders and the state government was used to address natural resource degradation and to establish the institutional arrangement for assuming the risks and liabilities associated with owning and managing ageing infrastructure. The process led to development of four "land and water management plans" for each district within the irrigation area.
The land and water management plans were community-based plans that had four stages of development: conceptualization, development, implementation and review (Martin 2005) .
Conceptualization. The conceptualization stage involved large public meetings held initially in each district to gain community support. This led to the election of community working groups that then made themselves available to discuss issues with non-farmer stakeholder groups such as local business associations (Martin 2005) . The two distributive and interactive justice components of legitimacy and acknowledgement during this conceptualisation were resolved by being inclusive of everyone who lived and worked in the region.
Development. The development stage included drawing on the advice of government and private sector experts while consulting with the community. This consultation occurred in several rounds of meetings in convenient places such as woolsheds, community halls, clubs and pubs (Marshall 2004) . For example, in one district (Berriquin), the initial round comprised 23 locality meetings, followed by other four rounds as the plan developed (Marshall 2001) . Feedback from these meetings was collated and analyzed, and then disseminated via newsletters, brochures and mass media (Marshall 2001) . The plans ended up being an integrated strategy of farm-and district-scale works, education, monitoring, and research and development programs, with a 30-year community-government implementation agreement. The two justice issues associated with voice (i.e. opportunity and influence) during this development stage were therefore addressed through a series of one-on-one discussions with landholders as well as extensive feedback mechanisms reporting on the changes resulting from those discussions.
Implementation. The implementation stage formalized the funding arrangements
between the community and government. The NSW Government agreed to give the landholders the irrigation infrastructure and to contribute $116 million over the first 15 years to implement the land and water management plans (Marshall 2004) . In return, the farmers agreed to contribute $382 million over 30 years to the same plans through "in kind" costs arising from adoption of the on-farm conservation measures included in the plans (Marshall 2004 ). The privatization process meant that each irrigator landowner with either land or water entitlements in the region were issued shares in an unlisted public company called Murray Irrigation Limited (McLeod & Warne 2008) . Murray Irrigation Limited became the largest privately-owned irrigation supply company in Australia, with responsibility for managing more than 10 per cent of the Murray Darling Basin's consumptive water use, supplying irrigation water to 1,600 family farm businesses covering 2,400 irrigation holdings over a total of 950,000 ha of intensively-managed agricultural land (McLeod & Warne 2008) . The two justice issues associated with this implementation phase (i.e. actual resource allocations and comparisons of these allocations) were therefore addressed by applying the principles of public versus private benefit for the government/landholder allocation and by allocating shares between landholders based on the amount of land and water they owned.
Review. The outcome from this process of community-based planning was widely regarded as being successful (Marshall 2001) . In terms of of the two components justice components of compliance and trust, it led to increased management efficiency, better information management and monitoring, improved environmental outcomes, more efficient use of water, fewer prosecutions for pollution or using excess water, and a greater sense of community by all landholders in the four districts (McLeod & Warne 2008) .
Case study 2: NSW Water Sharing Plans
Starting in 1999, the NSW Government started a detailed process to describe how water was to be shared between water users and the environment. The government set an initial broadscale target for recovering 10% of water for the environment and scientific evidence suggested that about two thirds of the flow needed to be recovered to maintain healthy functioning of rivers (Howard 2009 ).
The process for determining water allocations was through a number valley-based water sharing plans that were to be developed by the community. One particular plan focused on the regulated portion of the Murrumbidgee River that extends from Burrinjuck Dam to Balranald in New South Wales (Fig. 2) . There are 14 dams, eight large weirs and more than 10,000 kilometres of irrigation channels on this river which means that half of the Murrumbidgee's average annual flow (4,470,000 megalitres) gets diverted for irrigation (Bowmer, 2003) . The Murrumbidgee is the third largest river the Murray-Darling Basin and the most intensively developed for irrigation.
Conceptualization. The conceptualization stage of the allocation process by the NSW Government led to the appointment of people who represented specific groups: government agencies, nature conservation interests, landholder interests, indigenous interests and/or scientific interests (Howard 2009 ). This suggests that distributive and interactive justice were not properly addressed during the conceptualization phase because it led to key people, such as urban, recreational, or tourism interests being excluded. Indeed regional facilitators acknowledged that the process did not include some key groups and, in terms of interactive justice, even the participants felt it was unrepresentative and it led to people being typecast (Howard 2009 ).
Development. The development process was very conflict ridden. It involved 32 meetings over six years where decisions had to be made about different water allocations.
The information and science was largely provided by government to inform decisions.
During the development process the specifications about: the nature of the plans, what could be decided and how these plans were to be presented were changed by the department in charge of overseeing the process. Participants stated that the process did not meet their expectations. Some resigned, and others formed coalitions or went forum shopping (Howard 2009 ). Even the staff involved in coordinating the process in each region described the process as a joke (Howard 2009 ). The two justice issues associated with voice (i.e. opportunity and influence) during this developmental stage were therefore inadequately addressed, with the responsible department progressively reducing the opportunity and the influence available to participants in each region.
Implementation. The implementation stage consisted of allocating water between types of water users and the environment occurred. The better-resourced and more numerous stakeholder groups were able to influence the plan and cement their allocations for usage. Specifically, agricultural stakeholders were able to fight off a concerted push to allocate an extra 100 GL of water for the environment, and they tied minimum environmental flows to general security allocations despite the legislation indicating that environmental flows should be the first priority. They could do this because half way through the process the rules changed from planning by consensus to planning by majority. When put on display a number of the committee members had submitted dissenting reports. Moreover, a government review of the plan's compliance with NSW Government policy suggested that there were some key areas of the plan that warranted further consideration (Howard 2009 ). Indeed the communitybased planning process across Victoria and NSW seemed to end up with allocations largely predicated on history of use, with ineffective allocations of water being given to the environment (Ladson & Finlayson 2002) . Justice issues associated with the decisions (i.e.
actual resource allocations and comparisons of these allocations) were therefore not apparent as the principles on which allocations were made were not based on science or discussion, but on history and power.
Review. The end result of water allocation process has been widely regarded as an inadequate way to implement community-based NRM. Compliance and trust have been an ongoing issue. Various environmental and agricultural interest groups appealed 12 of the 36 water-sharing plans in the NSW Land and Environment Court, and most participants indicated a general lack of satisfaction with the process. Some plans in NSW are yet to be activated. In the end, farmers obtained a windfall gain of perpetual water rights, it cost tax payers over $100 million, it altered water allocations by a mere 0.5% across the state, and the department facilitating the process across the state ceased to exist (Howard 2009 ).
DISCUSSION
A central focus of research about community-based NRM has been concerned with examining the way in which the state can share rights and responsibilities over natural resources with and among various local communities. This ranges from community consultation in planning, to the complete handover of ownership of land and natural resources from the state to communities. These different forms of community-based NRM might be regarded as experiments in embracing, rethinking and resettling the role of the state, the distribution of power and the allocation of responsibilities. To date, much of the research on such processes has therefore largely focused on the question of the relationship between the state and the community. Fewer studies have focused on the role of the state when its role is that of an impartial spectator or a body that attempts to act as an honest broker.
Yet the emerging role for the state in community-based NRM tends to mean that governments are being increasingly asked to coordinate frameworks while the decisionmaking or delivery of outcomes is increasingly devolved to the community (Burgeon 2008).
The framework outlined in this paper helps push our understanding forward by identifying some eight key variables within justice literature suitable for comparative analysis, or for consideration, when the state acts as an impartial spectator or attempts to act as an honest broker.
The different aspects of justice within the framework should not be viewed as a way of determining outcomes, but might be applied to dampen or amplify the effects of factors and strategies that might occur through deliberations. For example, the case study on water allocations illustrates how early aspects of the planning process that might be viewed as unjust, such as lack of representation, cascaded or even became amplified later with participants forum shopping or by voting in blocks. Andrew and Edwards (2004) and Sabatier et al. (2005) outline examples where once an injustice is done, participants see the motives and actions of their opponents as unreasonable and then initiate actions and behaviours that might otherwise be regarded as unfair. The two cases provided here do not exhaust the entire range of possibilities within community-based NRM, nor can they provide the definitive analysis of justice when the state acts as a neutral facilitator. However, they do demonstrate how justice considerations need to be implemented throughout the process. The lesson for management being, justice is not something waiting to be assessed through investigation of the outcomes of community-based NRM, but something that must be constructed actively through the entire process of discussion, negotiation, and decision making around any proposed change to resource benefits and burdens.
These two case studies also show that there will always be issues associated with scale and complexity that managers will find hard to deal with. For example, it may be difficult to be inclusive of all groups in the conceptualization stage because of the size of the region involved. It may also be a challenge to cope with the complexity associated with multiple values, multiple stakeholders, different interests, multiple functions of natural resources such as water, and high stakes (van der Brugge et al. 2005) . For example, the NSW water sharing plans may have been harder to implement than the Murray land and water management plans simply because farmers viewed the water allocation process as a direct threat to their livelihoods. Moreover, when comparing the types of representation appointed to develop these water sharing plans, the agricultural groups were the only group potentially making a commitment while most of the other groups, such as the environmentalists, were only contributing. Therefore, the scale of interest or, in other words, the salience of the issue varied markedly between stakeholders involved in the water allocation case study and this may explain why the process more problematic.
Fairness and justice continues to be embraced as a widely used concept in the academic, NRM and governance literature. However, sociologists regard 'reality' as a construct and therefore multiple perspectives of reality will result in multiple perspectives of justice in community-based NRM. I have set out to draw on existing theory to provide some clarity on the application of fairness during community-based NRM and policy. The approach has been to offer an applied understanding of fairness as an organising framework rather than as a single overall normative theory. Thinking though fairness and applying possible contingencies and perspectives in community-based management in this way may be a more systematic way for facilitators and planners to identify critical factors that might influence outcomes or to reflect on program success. 
